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Individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) increase the ability and tendency to devote 
greater attentional control to a task—improving performance on a wide range of skills. In addition, re-
cent research on enclothed cognition demonstrates that the situational influence of wearing a white lab 
coat increases controlled attention, due to the symbolic meaning and physical experience of wearing the 
coat. We examined whether these positive influences on attentional control lead to negative performance 
outcomes on insight problem-solving, a task thought to rely on associative processes that operate largely 
outside of explicit attentional control. Participants completed matchstick arithmetic problems while either 
wearing a white lab coat or in a no-coat control condition. Higher WMC was associated with lower insight 
problem-solving accuracy in the no-coat condition. In the coat condition, the insight problem-solving ac-
curacy of lower WMC individuals dropped to the level of those higher in WMC. These results indicate that 
wearing a white lab coat led individuals to increase attentional control towards problem solving, hinder-
ing even lower WMC individuals from engaging in more diffuse, associative problem-solving processes, 
at which they otherwise excel. Trait and state factors known to increase controlled attention and improve 
performance on more attention-demanding tasks interact to hinder insight problem-solving.
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Working memory enables individuals to select, maintain, 
and update information relevant to current goals or con-
texts, in the presence of internal and external distraction, 
and across diverse and ongoing cognitions (Engle, 2002; Mc-
Cabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010; Ship-
stead, Lindsey, Marshall, Engle, 2014; Unsworth & Engle, 
2007). Because of the importance of these attention- and 
memory-related abilities to a wide variety of higher-order 
cognitive tasks, individuals with higher working memory 
capacity (WMC) generally exhibit a performance advantage 
over those with lower WMC (see Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 
2004, for a review). However, the advantage of higher WMC 
can be disrupted by situational factors that temporarily re-
duce one’s attentional resources, such as sleep deprivation 
(Ilkowska & Engle, 2010), performance pressure (Beilock & 
Carr, 2005), and performing two tasks at once (e.g., Rosen 
& Engle, 1997). Given its importance to professional and 
academic achievement (Alloway & Alloway, 2010; Hambrick 
& Meinz, 2011; Unsworth, McMillan, Brewer, & Spillers, 
2012), and close relationship with fluid intelligence (Con-
way, Kane, & Engle, 2003; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005; 
Shipstead et al., 2014; Unsworth, Fukuda, Awh, & Vogel, 
2014), it is not surprising that researchers are interested in 
finding ways to increase WMC (Harrison et al., 2014; Kling-
berg, 2010; Melby-Lervåg & Hulm, 2013; Morrison & Chein, 
2011; Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012). This goal is the ba-
sis for adaptive computerized training (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, 
Jonides, & Shah, 2012; Shipstead, Hicks, & Engle, 2012), 
and other activities targeting trait abilities (e.g., Diamond & 
Lee, 2011; Moreau & Conway, 2014), as well as state-based 
interventions, such as mindfulness meditation (Jha, Stanley, 
Kiyonaga, Wong, & Gelfand, 2010; Mrazek, Franklin, Phil-
lips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013) and journaling (Klein & Boals, 
2001; Ramirez & Beilock, 2011). 
However, recent evidence suggests that higher levels of at-
tentional control can harm performance on tasks that benefit 
from a more diffuse focus of attention, such as insight prob-
lem-solving (DeCaro, Van Stockum, & Wieth, under review; 
Wiley & Jarosz, 2012a). In the current study, we examine 
the interaction between trait and state factors known to in-
crease attentional control. We hypothesize that higher levels 
of attentional control may hinder insight problem-solving, 
whether produced by individual differences in WMC or a 
situational factor shown to increase controlled attention 
by eliciting deliberative thinking—wearing a white lab coat 
(Adam & Galinsky, 2012). Although greater attentional con-
trol is generally thought to be good for performance, it is 
possible that interventions designed to enhance controlled 
attention may restrict the ability to notice useful information 
that is important for some tasks, especially those that rely on 
creative or associative processes. 
ExEcutivE AttEntion And insight
Insight is the experience of suddenly realizing the solution 
to a problem that, just prior to this realization, appeared 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1932-6246.1164
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps  2014 | Volume 7
C. A. Van Stockum, Jr., & M. S. Decaro Enclothed Cognition and Controlled Attention
74
insurmountable. Insight problems are problems that tend to 
evoke this experience, and share characteristics that differ-
entiate them from other kinds of problems (Bowden, Jung-
Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Chu & MacGregor, 2011; 
Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005). The ability to attain insight often 
requires an individual to abandon prior ways of thinking and 
represent a problem in a new or unexpected way. 
According to special-process theory, insight solutions 
emerge from a set of cognitive processes that are not typi-
cally required for non-insight problem-solving (Bowden 
et al., 2005; Chein & Weisberg, 2014; Schooler & Melcher, 
1995). Specifically, it is believed that when individuals en-
counter a problem, they first create a mental representa-
tion of the problem and its parameters (Novick & Bas-
sock, 2005). Afterward, they select a solution approach in 
keeping with their representation of the problem (Mayer & 
Hegarty, 1996). However, with insight problem-solving, the 
initial representation is typically incorrect, and individu-
als often find themselves at an impasse (Ash, Jee, & Wiley, 
2012; Ohlsson, 1992). To overcome impasse, individuals 
must generate a new representation of the problem (i.e., re-
structure), in order to identify a viable solution approach 
(Ash, Cushen, & Wiley, 2009; Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, 
& Rhenius, 1999). Importantly, the ability to restructure is 
thought to depend on associative processes (e.g., spreading 
activation) that operate largely outside of conscious atten-
tional control (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 1998; Bowden et 
al., 2005; Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990; Dur-
so, Rea, & Dayton, 1994; Ohlsson, 1992; Schooler, Ohlsson, 
& Brooks, 1993; Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 
1995; Siegler, 2000). Insight is attained when individuals re-
structure their representation of the problem in a way that 
the solution path becomes suddenly apparent, leading to the 
characteristic “aha!” moment commonly associated with in-
sight problem-solving (Kounios, & Beeman, 2009; Smith & 
Kounios, 1996).
Evidence that insight problem-solving relies on associa-
tive processes comes from research demonstrating that fac-
tors that interfere with controlled attention actually improve 
insight problem-solving. For example, insight problem-solv-
ing is improved for individuals known to have lower trait 
levels of inhibitory control, such as individuals with fron-
tal lobe damage (Reverberi, Toraldo, D’Agostini, & Skrap, 
2005), Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD; 
White & Shah, 2011), or lower WMC (DeCaro et al., under 
review). Moreover, situational factors that reduce state levels 
of inhibition, such as moderate alcohol intoxication (Jarosz, 
Colflesh, & Wiley, 2012) and solving problems during one’s 
non-optimal time of day (Wieth & Zacks, 2011), improve 
insight accuracy. 
If a more diffuse focus of attention benefits insight, then 
insight problem-solving may be hindered by factors that 
increase attention to the problem-solving process. Con-
trolled attention may reduce insight problem-solving ac-
curacy for two reasons. First, attentional control supports 
the ability to inhibit distractions and focus on goal-relevant 
information (Engle, 2002; Engle & Kane, 2003; Unsworth 
& Engle, 2007), narrowing one’s search through the prob-
lem space (Wiley & Jarosz, 2012a), and constraining search 
sets in secondary or long-term memory (Unsworth & Engle, 
2007). Although generally useful for solving non-insight 
problems, such focused attention may lead individuals to 
overlook more distantly-related information held outside 
the perceived problem space (Wiley & Jarosz, 2012a). Sec-
ond, attentional control supports one’s ability to execute 
complex problem-solving approaches (Hambrick & Engle, 
2003; Wiley & Jarosz, 2012b). However, if individuals per-
sist in using such approaches, then they may be slower to 
recognize that their initial representation of the problem has 
created an impasse that can only be overcome by developing 
a new representation of the problem (Schooler, Fallshore, & 
Fiore, 1995). In support of these ideas, studies demonstrate 
that priming a more narrow focus of attention alters how 
individuals approach problems, resulting in less-creative so-
lutions (Friedman, Fishbach, Förster, & Werth, 2003), and 
fewer reports of insight (Wegbreit, Suzuki, Grabowecky, 
Kounios, & Beeman, 2012).
WMC is one individual-difference factor that supports 
the ability to allocate controlled attention toward task perfor-
mance. Indeed, it is thought that the ability to keep memory 
and attention organized around relevant information drives 
the positive relationship between WMC and performance 
on a wide range of skills (Shipstead et al., 2014; Unsworth 
et al., 2014). Research demonstrates that individuals initially 
prefer, or are biased towards, using these complex strategies 
when they have the attentional resources to do so (DeCaro & 
Beilock, 2010; Schelble, Therriault, & Miller, 2012). For ex-
ample, higher WMC individuals tend to look for patterns in 
random sequences (Wolford, Newman, Miller, & Wig, 2004), 
and continue to use complex, time-consuming algorithmic 
problem-solving approaches when simpler, more efficient 
strategies are available (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; DeCaro, 
Thomas, & Beilock, 2008). Thus, attentional control not only 
enables but may also promote a tendency to implement com-
plex problem-solving approaches—even if a controlled task 
approach is unnecessary or suboptimal (e.g., Gaissmaier, 
Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2006).
If higher WMC supports the ability and tendency to focus 
attention during problem solving, then this trait factor may 
lead to poorer performance on insight problems. In support 
of this idea, DeCaro, Van Stockum, and Wieth (under re-
view) found that higher WMC individuals performed less ac-
curately than lower WMC individuals on insight matchstick 
arithmetic problems. As discussed in greater detail below, 
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insight matchstick arithmetic problems require individuals 
to relax constraints that are typically associated with math-
ematical problem-solving (e.g., that there should be only one 
equal sign in an equation) in order to transform an incorrect 
arithmetical statement into a correct one (Knoblich et al., 
1999; Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001; Öllinger, Jones, & 
Knoblich, 2008). When they encounter an insight problem, 
higher WMC may encourage individuals to persist within a 
conventional, yet faulty, problem representation suited to an 
attention-demanding approach, in line with their exception-
al attentional control abilities (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009). 
State factors may also lead individuals to allocate con-
trolled attention towards problem solving, thereby impeding 
insight. As discussed above, several studies have demonstrat-
ed that insight problem-solving can be improved by tempo-
rarily reducing state levels of attentional control (Jarosz et al., 
2012; Wieth & Zacks, 2011). In line with such findings, other 
studies suggest that the converse may also be true—insight 
problem-solving can be harmed by temporarily increasing 
state levels of attentional control (Friedman et al., 2003; We-
gbreit et al., 2012). 
One means by which state attentional control may be 
increased is through the influence of an article of clothing 
worn by the individual—a phenomenon known as enclothed 
cognition (Adam & Galinsky, 2012). Enclothed cognition 
represents a specific case of embodied cognition, which 
recognizes that individuals’ psychological processes are in-
fluenced by their physical experiences (Niedenthal, 2007; 
Wilson, 2002). Specifically, the theory of enclothed cogni-
tion posits that the clothes people wear influence their psy-
chological processes by leading the wearer to behave in ways 
that are consistent with the clothes’ popular symbolic mean-
ing. For example, Adam and Galinsky (2012) demonstrated 
that wearing a white lab coat, prototypical of scientists and 
doctors, is commonly associated with carefulness, attentive-
ness, and responsibility (i.e., deliberative thinking). In line 
with these symbolic associations, Adam and Galinsky found 
that performance on measures of selective attention (i.e., a 
Stroop task) and sustained attention (i.e., a comparative vi-
sual search task) improved when individuals were randomly 
assigned to wear a white lab coat. However, performance did 
not improve when the lab coat was identified as an “artistic 
painter’s coat” as opposed to a “medical doctor’s coat.” Per-
formance also did not improve when participants merely saw 
the lab coat displayed on the desk in front of them through-
out the experiment, but did not wear the coat. These results 
suggest that wearing a lab coat leads individuals to embody 
the associated symbolic meaning, influencing the extent to 
which they devote attentional control to the task (Adam & 
Galinsky, 2012). In particular, a white lab coat appears to 
trigger heightened controlled processing that is likely to ben-
efit performance on a variety of attention-demanding tasks. 
currEnt study
The current study examined the independent and joint effects 
of WMC and wearing a white lab coat during insight prob-
lem-solving, in order to investigate how trait and state influ-
ences on attention interact to impact performance on tasks 
thought to benefit from less attentional control. The problems 
that participants completed are thought to depend on insight, 
to the extent that participants must inhibit their tendency 
to approach the problems using typical mathematical steps 
and algorithms, while also flexibly restructuring their initial 
problem representation to overcome impasse (Knoblich et 
al., 1999; Öllinger et al., 2008; see also Jones, 2003; Ohlsson, 
1992, 2011). Specifically, participants completed matchstick 
arithmetic problems, which are composed of false arithmetic 
statements using matchsticks representing Roman numerals, 
arithmetic operators (addition and subtraction symbols), and 
equal signs (see Figure 1). Participants were asked to trans-
form these false equations into true equations by moving a 
single matchstick to a different location or orientation.
Participants completed both non-insight and insight 
matchstick arithmetic problems. Non-insight matchstick 
problems (standard type problems; Knoblich et al., 1999; 
Öllinger et al., 2008) are solved by moving a matchstick rep-
resenting the number 1 (“I”) from one position to another. 
These problems rely on simple rule-based approaches consis-
tent with prior experience reordering values in an equation, 
and thus are unlikely to induce impasse or demand repre-
sentational change (Knoblich et al., 2001; Knoblich, Öllinger, 
& Spivey, 2005; Öllinger et al., 2008). In the current study, 
non-insight problems were used as filler items to reduce 
transfer across insight matchstick problems. In contrast, in-
sight matchstick problems (constraint relaxation problems; 
Knoblich et al., 1999; Öllinger et al., 2008; see also Ohlsson, 
2002) require relaxing certain preconceptions about equa-
tions (e.g., that equations have only one equal sign), and 
are likely to induce impasse and demand representational 
change (Knoblich et al., 2005; Öllinger et al., 2008). These 
problems are solved by changing the addition symbol to an 
equal sign (see Figure 1), and are thought to rely on more 
Figure 1. 
Matchstick arithmetic problems
reordering values in an equation, and performance on these problems is consistently close to 
ceiling (Knoblich et al., 1999, 2001). In the current study, non-insight problems were used as 
filler items to reduce transfer across insight matchstick problems. Solving insight problems
(constraint relaxation problems; Knoblich et al., 1999; Öllinger et al., 2008; see also Ohlsson, 
2002) requires relaxing certain preconceptions about equations (e.g., that equations have only 
one equal sign). These problems are solved by changing the addition symbol to an equal sign 
(see Figure 1), and are thought to rely on more associative-based approaches to reach solution 
(Knoblich et al., 1999, 2001; Knoblich, Öllinger, & Spivey, 2005) Reverberi et al., 2005).  
Figure 1. Example matchstick arithmetic problems 
 
During the problem-solving task, one group of participants was asked to wear a white lab 
coat (coat condition), as a state manipulation of their controlled attention; the others did not wear 
a lab coat (no-coat control condition). After the problem-solving portion of the experiment, 
participants completed an assessment of WMC, providing a measure of their trait ability to focus 
attention in a controlled manner (Kane et al., 2001). We were particularly interested in observing 
how higher attentional control—whether generated by higher trait WMC or a state manipulation 
of clothing—impacts insight problem-solving accuracy. Individuals lower in WMC have been 
shown to outperform higher WMC individuals on insight tasks, possibly because they use more 
flexible and diffuse attention to approach the problem (DeCaro, Van Stockum, & Wieth, under 
Insight 
Filler (Non-insight) 
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associative-based approaches to reach solution (Knoblich et 
al., 1999, 2001, 2005; Reverberi et al., 2005). 
During the problem-solving task, one group of partici-
pants was asked to wear a white lab coat (coat condition), 
as a state manipulation of their attentional control; the oth-
ers did not wear a lab coat (no-coat control condition). After 
the problem-solving portion of the experiment, participants 
completed an assessment of WMC, providing a measure of 
their trait ability to focus attention in a controlled manner 
(Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). We were partic-
ularly interested in observing how greater attentional con-
trol—whether generated by higher trait WMC or a state 
manipulation of clothing—impacts insight problem-solving 
accuracy. Lower WMC individuals have been shown to out-
perform higher WMC individuals on insight problems, pos-
sibly because they use more flexible and diffuse attention 
to approach the problems (DeCaro et al., under review). 
However, with the addition of a white lab coat to elicit at-
tentiveness, we expected lower WMC individuals to perform 
as poorly as higher WMC individuals. Such a finding would 
illustrate the interaction of trait and state factors on insight 
problem-solving. Moreover, such findings would represent a 
caveat to the traditional emphasis on improving attentional 
control: Manipulations intended to improve attentional con-
trol may hinder insight, particularly for those individuals 
who are typically best able to perform these tasks.
MEthods
PArticiPAnts
Participants were 96 undergraduate students enrolled in psy-
chology classes (73 female; age M = 20.89, SD = 4.02; range 
18–43 years). An additional six participants were excluded 
from the study: three for prior exposure to matchstick arith-
metic problems, two for committing more than 20 percent 
errors on the sentence portion of the working memory task 
(aRspan; Conway et al., 2005), and one for failing to com-
ply with instructions (i.e., put coat on backwards). An addi-
tional two participants were identified as univariate outliers 
(scored below 2.5 SD from the mean on the WMC measure). 
Participants received course credit for participation. 
coAt MAniPulAtion 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions: coat (n = 55), or no-coat control (n = 41). Participants 
in the coat condition were additionally randomly assigned 
to either a “doctor’s coat” (n = 30) or “painter’s coat” (n = 25) 
condition, and provided a cover story adapted from Adam 
and Galinsky (2012, Experiment 1). Participants in the 
coat condition were told that construction had taken place 
in the lab earlier in the semester, and to protect clothing 
during construction, everyone wore coats (“doctor’s coats” 
or “painter’s coats,” depending on condition). Even though 
the construction was completed, participants were asked to 
wear the coat, so that all participants would be in the same 
situation. However, we did not fully replicate the method-
ology used by Adam and Galinsky (2012), who called each 
coat either a “medical doctor’s coat” or an “artistic painter’s 
coat” and did not include a distinction between coats in the 
experiment in which they used the construction cover story. 
Given the pervasive association between creativity and art 
in lay conceptions of creativity (Glăveanu, 2014), including 
the word “artistic” potentially triggered implicit theories of 
creativity (Hass, 2014), which deviate from trait profiles typi-
cally attributed to doctors and scientists (Feist, 1998). How-
ever, in the context of the construction cover story, a “paint-
er’s coat” is unlikely to be associated with creativity, and 
more with qualities attributed to everyday professionals (i.e., 
a conventional painter in a construction setting; Glăveanu, 
2014). Due to the minor contribution of this manipulation to 
the overall methodology (i.e., the word “doctor’s” or “paint-
er’s” coat was only mentioned two times), and the finding of 
Adam and Galinsky (2012, Experiment 1) that simply wear-
ing a lab coat with no explicit label increased attention, we 
therefore ultimately expected to find no differences between 
the two coat conditions. 
MAtEriAls
Problem-Solving Task
Matchstick Arithmetic (Knoblich et al., 1999) was used as 
the problem-solving measure. Matchstick arithmetic prob-
lems are false arithmetic statements written with Roman nu-
merals (I, II, III, etc.), arithmetic operators (+, −), and equal 
signs depicted as matchsticks. Each matchstick problem is 
composed of three roman numerals separated by an operator 
and an equal sign, and has a unique solution consisting of a 
single move. For each problem, participants were instructed 
to transform the false arithmetic statement into a true arith-
metic statement while adhering to the following rules: (a) 
only one matchstick can be moved, (b) matchsticks cannot 
be discarded or added, and (c) the answer must be a correct 
arithmetic statement. Participants completed three insight 
problems and three non-insight problems used as filler prob-
lems (Figure 1), presented in random order on the computer. 
Participants recorded their answers on paper. Each problem 
was displayed for a maximum of two minutes before auto-
matically advancing to the next problem.
Working Memory Measure
The Automated Reading Span task (aRspan) was used to 
measure WMC (Redick et al., 2012). The aRspan is a com-
plex memory span task, which interleaves a secondary 
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attention-demanding processing task between items presented 
for serial recall. In the aRspan, participants are shown a sen-
tence and asked to determine whether it makes sense or not; 
then they are shown a letter. After a sequence of 3–7 sentence-
letter strings, participants are asked to recall the letters in or-
der. A total of 15 sequences of sentence-letter strings, including 
three of each length, are presented in random order. ARspan 
scores consist of the total number of memory items (i.e., let-
ters) recalled correctly, regardless of serial position (Conway 
et al., 2005; Redick et al., 2012). Scores range from 0–75, with 
higher scores denoting greater levels of attentional control (i.e., 
WMC; Kane et al., 2001; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 
2005). The task takes 15–20 minutes to complete.
ProcEdurE
After providing informed consent, participants were seated 
in private testing rooms. Participants randomly assigned to 
the coat condition were then given the cover story described 
above. Participants in the no-coat control condition were not 
asked to wear a coat and were not given any additional in-
structions. All participants then completed the matchstick 
arithmetic problems. Following the problem-solving task, 
participants in the coat condition were told that the remain-
ing activities were new to the experiment, and coats were col-
lected. Then, all participants completed the aRspan. Finally, 
participants completed a questionnaire with items about pre-
vious experience with matchstick arithmetic problems and 
demographics, and were debriefed.
rEsults
We hypothesized that trait and state factors that increase 
attentional control would interact to reduce insight prob-
lem-solving accuracy. Specifically, we predicted that higher 
WMC would be associated with less accurate insight prob-
lem-solving in the no-coat (control) condition. Additionally, 
we predicted that wearing a white lab coat would reduce in-
sight problem-solving accuracy. Because of methodological 
differences between our study and that of Adam and Galin-
sky (2012), we did not expect to find differences between the 
“doctor’s coat” and “painter’s coat” conditions. We expected 
that wearing a white lab coat would primarily impact lower 
WMC individuals, by reducing their insight problem-solv-
ing accuracy relative to the performance of lower WMC in-
dividuals in the no-coat condition. 
We first examined WMC scores as a function of condi-
tion, to verify random assignment and rule out the poten-
tial for any carryover effects from the coat manipulation. No 
significant differences were found (no-coat condition: M = 
58.41, SD = 8.30; coat condition: M = 59.35, SD = 8.54; F 
< 1). Non-insight (filler) problems were submitted to the 
same analyses as insight problems (described below). No 
significant differences in non-insight problem-solving accu-
racy were found, either as a function of condition, WMC, or 
their interaction (M = 38.19%, SD = 33.50, all ps > .3).
We examined the impact of WMC and condition on in-
sight problem-solving accuracy using ordinary least squares 
regression. Helmert contrast-coded variables were em-
ployed to test planned comparisons between conditions. 
The first contrast allowed us to test for differences between 
the two coat conditions (doctor’s coat versus painter’s coat), 
and the second contrast allowed us to examine differences 
between the no-coat condition and the two coat conditions 
combined (see West, Aiken, & Krull, 1996). The model in-
cluded WMC scores (mean centered), the two contrast-cod-
ed condition variables, and a WMC by condition interaction 
term for each contrast. 
There was no main effect of WMC (B = -.01, SE = .01, p = 
.525). There was also no main effect of condition for either 
contrast-coded variable (doctor’s coat versus painter’s coat: B 
= -.30, SE = .30, p = .298; no-coat versus coat conditions com-
bined: B = -.13, SE = .22, p = .555). As expected, there was 
no interaction between WMC and the doctor’s coat versus 
painter’s coat contrast (B = .06, SE = .02, p = .773), suggesting 
that the relationship between WMC and insight problem-
solving accuracy was similar across the two coat conditions. 
However, as predicted, a significant WMC by condition in-
teraction was found when the two coat conditions were com-
bined (i.e., no-coat condition versus combined coat condi-
tion; B = .06, SE = .03, p = .021, sr2 = .05). Taken together, 
these findings suggest that the act of wearing a white lab coat 
led individuals to perform the insight problems differently, 
depending on differences in WMC. 
In addition, the data were examined by estimating a Bayes 
factor using Bayesian Information Criteria (Jarosz & Wiley, 
2014). This analysis compares the fit of the data under the 
Figure 2. 
Insight problem accuracy as a function of working memory 
capacity and condition.
Note: Lower and higher working memory points are plotted 
at ±1SD from the mean.
that the data were .505:1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, or rather, 1.98 times more likely to 
occur under a model including an interaction between WMC and condition (no-coat, coat) than a 
model without it. 
Figure 2.  
Insight problem accuracy as a function of working memory capacity and condition. 
 
Note: Lower and higher working memory points are plotted at ±1SD from the mean. 
Subsequent regression analyses were conducted to examine the nature of this interaction. As 
shown in Figure 2, WMC was significantly negatively associated with insight problem-solving 
accuracy in the no-coat condition (B = −.05, SE = .02, p = .015, sr2 = .06). No relationship between 
WMC and insight problem-solving accuracy was observed for the coat condition (B = .01, SE = .02, p 
= .422). We also compared insight problem-solving accuracy between the coat and no-coat 
conditions separately for individuals scoring higher or lower on the WMC measure, by recentering 
the WMC variable at 1 SD above and below the mean, respectively (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 
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null hypothesis to that under the alternative hypothesis. An 
estimated Bayes factor (null/alternative) suggested that the 
data were .505:1 in favor of the alternative hypothesis, or 
rather, 1.98 times more likely to occur under a model includ-
ing an interaction between WMC and condition (no-coat, 
coat) than a model without it.
Subsequent regression analyses were conducted to exam-
ine the nature of this interaction. As shown in Figure 2, WMC 
was significantly negatively associated with insight problem-
solving accuracy in the no-coat condition (B = −.05, SE = 
.02, p = .015, sr2 = .06). No relationship between WMC and 
insight problem-solving accuracy was observed for the coat 
condition (B = .01, SE = .02, p = .422). We also compared in-
sight problem-solving accuracy between the coat and no-coat 
conditions separately for individuals scoring higher or lower 
on the WMC measure, by recentering the WMC variable at 1 
SD above and below the mean, respectively (Cohen, Cohen, 
Aiken, & West, 2003). For lower WMC individuals, wearing 
the coat significantly reduced insight problem-solving accu-
racy, compared to the accuracy of lower WMC individuals in 
the no-coat control condition (B = −.67, SE = .31, p = .036, 
sr2 = .04). For higher WMC individuals, no significant dif-
ferences in insight problem-solving accuracy were found be-
tween conditions (B = .42, SE = .32, p = .188). Wearing a white 
lab coat appears to have selectively impaired insight problem-
solving for lower WMC individuals, leading them to perform 
in a manner comparable to higher WMC individuals.
discussion
Attentional control benefits performance on a range of high-
er-order cognitive tasks (see Barrett et al., 2004, for a review). 
Indeed, it is generally assumed that individuals with higher 
trait attentional control hold a performance advantage over 
those with lower attentional control (Engle, 2002; Hambrick 
& Meinz, 2011; Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 
2009). Recent interest in situational factors that temporar-
ily increase state attentional control (Autin & Croizet, 2012), 
and the potential for training (Sternberg, 2008), is guided 
by such findings. The current study examined whether two 
factors previously shown to increase controlled attention—
higher WMC (Kane et al., 2001) and wearing a white lab coat 
(Adam & Galinsky, 2012)—have the counterintuitive effect 
of decreasing insight problem-solving accuracy, thought to 
rely on associative processes operating largely outside of con-
scious control (e.g., Bowden et al., 2005; Bowers et al., 1990; 
Durso et al., 1994; Schooler et al., 1993; Siegler, 2000). 
Participants completed insight problems (matchstick 
arithmetic; Knoblich et al., 1999), while either wearing a 
white lab coat (coat condition) or not (no-coat condition). Af-
terward, participants completed a measure of WMC. Higher 
WMC was associated with poorer insight problem-solving 
accuracy in the no-coat control condition. However, when 
participants wore a white lab coat, an act commonly associ-
ated with deliberative thinking, lower WMC individuals per-
formed just as poorly as higher WMC individuals. Wearing 
the lab coat appears to have co-opted lower WMC individu-
als’ advantage during insight problem-solving.  
These findings contribute to a growing body of research 
demonstrating that higher WMC does not confer a perfor-
mance advantage on all tasks, and can even hinder perfor-
mance on tasks that demand a less-controlled approach 
(DeCaro & Beilock, 2010). In the context of problem solving, 
a more diffuse focus of attention may allow individuals to see 
less obvious but potentially insightful solution paths (Wiley & 
Jarosz, 2012a). Previous studies have demonstrated that trait 
and state factors that reduce controlled attention increase 
insight accuracy (DeCaro et al., under review; Jarosz et al., 
2012; Reverberi et al., 2005; Wieth & Zacks, 2011). The cur-
rent study complements and expands upon this literature by 
demonstrating that factors that increase controlled attention 
interact to harm insight. Critically, increasing state attention-
al control selectively impaired the performance of individuals 
who would otherwise excel (i.e., those with lower WMC).
In addition, these findings suggest that situational fac-
tors that temporarily increase attentional control lead lower 
WMC individuals to adopt information-processing strate-
gies that are more characteristic of higher-capacity individu-
als. Previous research suggests several possible ways this 
processing shift may occur. For example, individuals may be 
more likely to persist with algorithmic, attention-demanding 
strategies that are less optimal for insight problem-solving 
(cf. Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; DeCaro et al., 2008; Gaissma-
ier et al., 2006). Alternatively, the white lab coat may have 
induced a more local (i.e., narrow) information-processing 
style, leading individuals to focus on the component parts 
of a problem (Luria & Vogel, 2011; Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein, 
& Humphreys, 2008). Local processing has been shown to 
detriment insight problem-solving, relative to a more global 
processing style, in which attention is directed towards over-
all patterns and meaningful relationships or configurations 
(Friedman et al., 2003; see Förster & Denzler, for a review). 
Similarly, greater attentional control may lead individuals to 
“overshadow” non-verbal processes important for insight, 
by promoting explicit, detail-oriented verbal representations 
that rely more heavily on attentional control (Chin & School-
er, 2008; Schooler et al., 1993). Future research is needed to 
more fully explore the mechanisms by which increasing at-
tentional control harms insight. 
The current findings also provide additional evidence for 
the impact of enclothed cognition on information process-
ing and task performance. The theory of enclothed cognition 
suggests that physically wearing clothing associated with cer-
tain symbolic meaning (e.g., a white lab coat, associated with 
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qualities typically attributed to scientific or medical profes-
sions) leads the wearer to behave in accordance with that 
symbolic meaning (Adam & Galinsky, 2012). In support of 
this theory, Adam and Galinsky (2012) found that wearing 
a white lab coat was associated with carefulness and atten-
tiveness, and likewise improved performance on attention-
demanding tasks. We extend this finding to demonstrate that 
wearing a lab coat can lead to sub-optimal insight problem 
solving. Although Adam and Galinsky’s findings imply that 
wearing certain types of clothing is more likely to lead to suc-
cess, the current results suggest that optimal performance 
depends on a fit between situational factors (e.g., clothing 
type), individual differences, and task demands. 
The theory of enclothed cognition is based on more gen-
eral theories of embodied cognition, which emphasize the 
role that the body and the environment play in perception, 
knowledge, and behavior (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007; Pezzulo et 
al., 2011; Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Golonka, 2013). The ma-
jority of research on embodied cognition demonstrates that 
embodiment activates existing knowledge. However, recent 
studies have also explored the role of embodiment in the cre-
ation of new knowledge or insights. For example, enacting 
certain metaphors for creative thinking, such as “thinking 
outside the box” (Leung et al., 2012) or “going with one’s gut” 
(Aiello, Jarosz, Cushen, & Wiley, 2012), increases perfor-
mance on creative tasks. The current findings contribute to 
this discourse by demonstrating the converse—that embodi-
ment can inhibit the creation of new knowledge or insights.  
In conclusion, situational factors that temporarily in-
crease attentional control, such as the embodied act of wear-
ing a white lab coat, may have a counterproductive impact 
on the production of insight. These findings reveal an im-
portant potential downside to trait- and state-based working 
memory training and enhancement. Although improving 
attentional control generally benefits performance on atten-
tion-demanding tasks, it may selectively impair performance 
for individuals who might otherwise be more insightful. 
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